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The Constitution's revision after the Civil War reflected distinctions
that  the Reconstruction's  legal  culture  drew  among  different  kinds  of
rights.'  That culture operated comfortably with distinctions among civil
rights, political  rights and social rights.2  Even  during  the post-Recon-
struction  period,  the distinctions  were  not entirely  stable.  In the past
century,  the definition of civil rights has  continued to change.  Today's
legal culture treats the right to vote and the right of unimpeded access to
public  accommodations  as  civil  rights,3  not  as  the  political  or  social
rights they would  have been treated as  a century  ago.  We continue to
distinguish civil rights from  social rights, but we take our definition  of
social  rights  from  the emerging  criteria  of international  human  rights
law:  social rights deal with the material bases of human well-being and
include the rights to shelter,  to a job under decent  working conditions
and to subsistence.4
In this Essay I suggest a parallel between the Reconstruction  legal
culture and contemporary  legal culture.  During the Reconstruction era,
*  Professor of Law, Georgetown University  Law Center;  B.A.,  1967,  Harvard Univer-
sity; M.A.,  1971,  Yale  University; J.D.,  1971,  Yale University.
1. The analysis in Section I draws from, and in many ways summarizes, the argument in
Mark Tushnet,  The Politics of Equality in Constitutional  Law:  The Equal Protection Clause,
Dr.  Du Bois, and Charles  Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM.  HisT. 884 (1987)  [hereinafter Tushnet,
Politics of Equality].  The analysis in Section II is based  on a paper presented  at the annual
meeting of the American Philosophical Association,  Eastern Division, December  1991.  Mark
Tushnet,  Philosophical Implications  of Recent Developments  in Central and Eastern Europe
(Dec.  1991)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file with  author).  Tom  Krattenmaker  made  ex-
tremely helpful  comments on that paper.
2.  For an  example  of the distinction's  influence, see Plessy  v.  Ferguson,  163  U.S.  537
(1896)  (segregation  statute not unconstitutional,  in part because argument for nonsegregation
rests on claim of equality in respect to social rights unprotected by Fourteenth Amendment),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.,  347  U.S. 483  (1954).
3.  See, e.g.,  Voting Rights Act of 1965,  42 U.S.C. §§  1973-1973bb-1  (1988);  Americans
With  Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.  §§  12101-12213  (Supp.  1991).
4. See International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S.  4, 6-7.  There  is an emerging  category of third-generation  rights that implicate  the
rights  of groups as such.  See Speech of Karel Vasak in Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human
Rights:  A  New  Generation  for the 1980's?, 33  RUTGERS  L. REv.  435  (1981).  However,  for
present purposes I intend to ignore that  category.
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legal thinkers believed that the distinctions among civil, political and so-
cial rights were immutable  and almost inherent in the nature  of society.
Similarly,  today many commentators  distinguish  sharply  between  civil
rights and social rights:  civil rights are absolute and must be provided in
any civilized  society, while social rights are necessarily contingent  on a
society's  level  of  economic  development.  Additionally,  contemporary
commentators believe that courts can enforce civil rights but cannot en-
force  social rights.'  I argue, in  contrast, that these  distinctions are  no
less  contingent  than the  ones  Reconstruction  legal  culture  drew.  The
future of the Reconstruction Amendments, I suggest,  may resemble their
past:  seemingly immutable  definitions of fundamental categories of legal
analysis may change before  our eyes.
I.  CIVIL,  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  RIGHTS  IN RECONSTRUCTION
LEGAL CULTURE
For Reconstruction  legal  thinkers  civil,  political  and  social  rights
were  seen  as  three distinct  categories.  Civil  rights attached  to  people
simply because they were people; they were the rights one had in a state
of nature, such as the right to personal freedom of action, the right to life
and the right to select and pursue a life plan.'  The Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected  these civil rights.7
Political rights, in contrast, arose from a person's  location in an organ-
ized  political  system.'  These included  the right to vote and  otherwise
participate  in the political life  of the community  by, for example, jury
service.  The Fifteenth Amendment protected  the central political right
to vote.9  Social rights were exercised  in the rest of the social  order and,
most importantly, in the market.  For Reconstruction legal thought, gov-
ernment had nothing to do with guaranteeing  social rights except to en-
force those rights guaranteed  by the common law.10
5.  See, e-g.,  Cass Sunstein,  Constitutionalism,  Prosperity,  Democracy.  Transition in East-
ern Europe, 2 CONST.  POL. ECON. 371,  383 (1991)  ("A constitution that creates positive rights
is  not  likely to  be subject  to judicial enforcement,  because  these rights  are vaguely  defined,
simultaneously  involve the interests  of numerous  people, and  depend  for  their  existence  on
active management of government institutions--something  for which judges are ill-suited.").
6.  See MICHAEL K. CURTis,  No STATE SHALL  ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH  AMEND-
MENT  AND  THE  BILL  OF RIGHTS 41-54 (1986).
7.  U.S.  CONST. amend.  XIV, § 1. The list of "privileges  and immunities"  in Corfield  v.
Coryell,  6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)  (No. 3230)  was the source of illustrations of civil
rights  for this era.
8. Or, in some versions,  in a well-organized  political  system where the adjective implies
that there  are normative constraints on how a government  can  properly be organized.
9.  U.S.  CONsT.  amend. XV.
10.  Consider here  the  fact that the United  States Supreme  Court believed  it relevant  to
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Even during Reconstruction,  difficulties arose in sustaining the idea
that these types of rights were categorically  different.  For example, dur-
ing the congressional debates on the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the right to  serve on a jury was routinely described as  a political
right,11  and  the  audience  was  repeatedly  assured  that  the Fourteenth
Amendment  would not guarantee African Americans  that right. 2  Yet
some  participants  offered broader  definitions  of civil  rights.  When the
United States Supreme Court was faced with a constitutional  challenge
to a statute barring African Americans from jury service, it had no diffi-
culty concluding  that the statute violated the Constitution. 3  The  deci-
sion  rested  on  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  but  its  conceptual  basis
surely was found in the Fifteenth: 4  because the Constitution guaranteed
the most important political right there, it would have been senseless to
insist that a less important political right was unprotected,  even though
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have thought that it pro-
tected no political rights at all.
More  embarrassing  to  proponents  of the Fourteenth  Amendment
was  a problem created by their insistence that civil rights included the
right to enter into contracts.  Their opponents pointed out that marriage
was founded  on contract and argued that it therefore followed  that the
Fourteenth  Amendment would outlaw state statutes barring interracial
marriage.  Proponents  responded  feebly  that the right to contract  was
not denied by such a law because it imposed equal disabilities on whites
and  African  Americans. 5  Unfortunately  for  this  argument the Four-
teenth Amendment's supporters tended to distinguish between the Equal
Protection  Clause,  which dealt with equality, and the Privileges or Im-
munities  Clause, which,  they argued when the issue of racial intermar-
riage  was  not  before  them,  guaranteed  some  fundamental  rights
including the right to contract,  in a  non-comparative  way.
Thus  even at the outset, the distinctions  among civil, political and
discuss the common law obligations  of common carriers in the Civil Rights Cases, 109  U.S. 3,
21-22  (1883)  (superseded by statute  as stated  in Fisher v.  Shamburg,  624 F.2d  156,  159-60
(10th  Cir.  1980)).  By the turn  of the twentieth  century,  the  dominant  position  was  even
stronger:  the government  could not attempt  to protect  social  rights.  See Lochner  v.  New
York,  198 U.S. 45, 61,  64 (1905),  repudiated  by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421  (1952)  and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726  (1963).
11.  See Tushnet, Politics of Equality, supra note  1, at 887.
12.  See id.
13.  Strauder  v. West Virginia,  100 U.S. 303,  310  (1879).
14.  U.S. CONST.  amend. XV.  The Fifteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:  "The
right of citizens  of the United  States to  vote shall not be denied  or abridged  by the  United
States or by any  State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."  Id. § 1.
15.  See Tushnet, Politics of Equality, supra note  1, at 887-88.
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social rights were unstable.  As the array of social power in the country
changed  so did the accepted understanding  of the distinctions.  Overall,
the  distinctions  proved no  more stable than  the society  itself.  By the
middle of the twentieth  century, if not earlier, civil rights had come to
subsume  most of the rights that earlier had been  called political  rights.
The New Deal revolution in constitutional  law weakened  the claim that
social  rights-those primarily  implicated in  market transactions-were
somehow free from government regulation.  In addition, the legal realists
persuaded  the legal culture that, analytically, we could not easily  argue
that  the government  lacked  power to  define  social rights:  the  market
itself, and  therefore  everything  that flowed  from  market  transactions,
was structured by government. 6
By the middle of the twentieth century, the claim that governments
had to  protect  social  rights  was  pressed  more  urgently.  International
norms  of human  rights came  to  include  social  rights.  Working-class
movements in Western Europe gained political power and with it began
to show that governments  could take on the task of guaranteeing  social
rights.  From the nineteenth  century  on,  many had found  the  socialist
ideals that underlay those movements attractive, and governments began
to respond to those ideals.  Another source of social and economic rights
was  President  Franklin  Roosevelt's  articulation  of  the  "Four
Freedoms." 7
Today's legal culture finds the idea of social rights comfortable in a
way that would have seemed  quite strange to Reconstruction  legal  cul-
ture.  The  process  by  which  it  became  comfortable,  however,  is  not
strange  at  all:  distinctions  among  rights  have  always  been  unstable  in
fact,  though participants  in any particular legal  culture  tend  to believe
that their culture's definitions of the categories are embedded in the na-
16.  The standard citations for this proposition are Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribu-
tion in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38  POL.  SCL  Q. 470 (1923),  and  Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13  CORNELL  L.Q. 8 (1927).
17.  9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS  AND  ADDRESSES  OF FRANKLIN  D. ROOSEVELT  672  (Samuel
Rosenman  ed.,  1950).  In his  1941  annual message  to Congress, Roosevelt  asserted that:
In  the  future  days,  which  we seek  to  make  secure,  we  look  forward  to  a  world
founded  upon four  essential freedoms.  The  first is freedom  of speech  and expres-
sion-everywhere  in the world.  The second is freedom  of every person  to worship
God in his own way-everywhere  in the world.  The third is freedom  from want-
which, translated into world terms, means economic understanding which will secure
to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants-everywhere  in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear-which, translated into world terms, means a world-
wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no
nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neigh-
bor-anywhere  in the world.
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ture of society.  Today the differences  are taken to be that social rights
are more contingent than civil rights and that only civil rights are appro-
priate  subjects for judicial enforcement.  I argue  next that these differ-
ences are no  less contingent than the ones Reconstruction legal  culture
found to be natural.
II.  DEFINING  AND  ENFORCING  SOCIAL  RIGHTS
In speaking of civil rights, as defined in today's legal culture, many
have been influenced by Dworkin's idea that rights are "trumps,"  that is,
considerations  that  absolutely  override  competing  factors.18  Further,
many appear to believe that, at least in advanced  constitutional systems,
civil rights must be enforceable through some sort of judicial proceeding.
It has been  contended that social rights  are different.  They  often
seem to require social provision; governments cannot simply stand aside,
but must  take positive  steps to assure  that rights to  shelter,  food and
work are honored.19  Yet, although courts are well positioned to protect
civil rights, they are ill-suited to enforce social rights; courts cannot de-
vise effective methods of ensuring that shelter, food or jobs are available
to  citizens.  The latter  point is  reflected  in international  human  rights
documents,  which typically declare  that social rights are to be provided
to the degree compatible with the state of economic development of each
society;  no such qualifications attach  to the description  of civil rights.20
I believe the foregoing claims are wrong.2  First, civil rights are not
in fact absolute in any interesting sense; that social rights cannot be abso-
18.  See Ronald Dworkin, Is  There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
177,  211  (1981)  (contending that rights can, in some instances, be "trumps"  over general wel-
fare).  In a weaker, more plausible version, rights override competing factors unless those fac-
tors are truly extraordinary.  For my purposes, nothing turns upon which version of the idea of
"rights  as trumps"  one accepts.
19.  See David  M. Trubek,  Economic, Social, and Cultural  Rights in  The Third World:
Human Rights Law and Human Needs Programs, in  HUMAN  RIGHiS  IN  INTERNATIONAL
LAW:  LEGAL  AND  POLICY IssuEs 205, 205-33  (Theodor Meron  ed.,  1984).
20. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional  Options  for  Post-Apartheid  South Africa, 40
EMORY  L.J. 745,  779-80 (1991).
21.  In one  dimension  that is sometimes  overlooked,  the claims may  well be pernicious.
Given  the  historical legacy  of the  regimes in  Eastern and  Central Europe, the  people there
have become accustomed to the idea that they are entitled to second-generation rights (that is
economic and social rights).  See FRANK NEWMAN  & DAVID  WEISSBRODT,  INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN  RIGHTS  363  (1990)  (defining  "social  welfare rights").  Further, the role of interna-
tional norms  in assisting the  successor regimes  in attaining  legitimacy  means  that those re-
gimes  can  (strategically)  defend  their  adherence  to pre-revolutionary  modes  of social  and
economic organization by referring to the international guarantees of second-generation  rights.
As a result, abjuring second-generation  rights would amount to a historical regression.
If  we examine how civil and social rights emerged, however, we might be troubled by one
aspect of such a regression.  Typically guarantees  of rights to women lagged behind guarantees
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lute, therefore,  does not distinguish them from  civil rights.  Second,  en-
forcing both civil  and social rights requires  the same degree  of judicial
action, whether the action be a lot or a little.
A.  Non-Absolute Rights:  Civil and Social
Legal philosophers in the United States may have been beguiled by
Dworkin's treatment of rights as trumps in part because they are familiar
with the so-called  absolutist tradition in free  speech adjudication.  The
absolutist tradition,  associated  with Justice  Hugo Black,  took the lan-
guage of the First Amendment to mean what it said:  Congress shall pass
no law abridging the freedom  of speech means that Congress  shall pass
no law.22  In closely  aligned constitutional  traditions,  however,  the for-
mulations are somewhat  different.  These traditions reflect a balancing of
competing interests.
The preface to the Canadian  Charter of Rights  and Freedoms,  for
example, provides that rights are "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law  as can be demonstrably justified in a free and  demo-
cratic society."23  One can imagine a constitution that protects social and
economic rights with an analogous preface.  Indeed, the standard formu-
lation that the rights are to be provided to the degree compatible with the
society's level of economic development seems a suitable transformation.
This formulation is an expression of the underlying idea that rights are
qualified by the social setting-the values of a free and democratic soci-
ety  in  one  case,  the level  of economic  development  in  the other-in
which they are exercised  or guaranteed.
The Canadian example is particularly interesting because the draft-
ers and interpreters  of the Canadian  Charter were and have been influ-
enced greatly by the constitutional experience of the United States.  Some
of the influence  was  by way of negative  example,  with the  Canadians
attempting  to  avoid  some  problems  they  associated  with  the  United
States Constitution.  More of the influence,  however, was positive, with
the  Canadians  imitating  the  United  States'  experience.  I  believe  the
Charter's preface is an example of positive rather than negative influence.
to men.  To  oversimplify,  when men  had civil  rights, women  had  no rights;  when  men  had
political rights, women had civil rights; when men had social and economic rights, women had
political  rights.  As intermittent news  reports suggest, it seems likely that women  will be the
first victims  of a regression  in the  protection of social  rights.  (There  is,  I should stress,  no
analytic connection between abjuring protection of social rights and increasing  discrimination
against women.)
22.  See, eg.,  Bridges v.  California,  314 U.S.  252, 263  (1941).
23.  CAN.  CONST.  (Constitution  Act,  1982)  pt. I (Canadian  Charter of Rights  and Free-
doms), § 1.
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That  is, the drafters  believed,  I think correctly,  that the constitutional
tradition in the United States was not absolutist, Black and Dworkin to
the contrary notwithstanding.  The central tradition balances  competing
interests; the absolutist tradition simply offers a rhetorical device to insist
that the values protected by the Constitution are very great values, which
ought not be overridden except when truly  necessary.24
Yet there is nothing to distinguish social and economic  rights from
civil  and  political  rights  in  this  regard.  That  is,  a  society  could  and
should,  under international  human  rights norms,  treat social  and eco-
nomic rights as expressing very great values.  These should be promoted
except  when  it  is truly  impossible  to do  so.  In this  way  social rights
could be integrated into the absolutist tradition.
B.  Negative and Affirmative Obligations
Requiring  governments to promote social rights, however,  immedi-
ately suggests that social rights differ from civil rights, because  govern-
ments  must  only protect civil  rights.  Affirmative  governmental  action
seems to be required to promote social rights; someone, and legislatures
are the obvious candidates, must establish programs for public provision
of housing, food and work in order to implement  social rights.  In con-
trast, civil rights seem to be largely negative; all governments must do to
promote them is to stand aside, not interfere  with free speech or voting
rights, and the like.
The contrast is heightened when the idea of rights is coupled  with
the thought that, to deserve to be called a right, an interest must be pro-
tected by an  enforcement mechanism  that can compel compliance  with
the right.  Thus, courts stand ready to invalidate laws that interfere with
free speech.  But, if social rights are the same as civil rights, then courts
would have to stand ready to say, for example, that the legislature's pub-
lic housing program falls short of what the Constitution requires.  There-
fore, it would  seem that the courts  could  force  the legislature to raise
taxes and devise  a more adequate program.  Yet there is little reason to
think that judges would  be adept at figuring out how  to move from  an
unconstitutionally  deficient housing policy to a constitutionally accepta-
ble  one.  Moreover,  the vision  of judges  compelling  the  imposition  of
24.  I believe that Dworkin's characterization of rights as trumps is, in the end, compatible
with the absolutist formulation.  Some of Justice Black's defenders explained his position simi-
larly.  Richard  H.  Pildes  & Elizabeth  S. Anderson,  Slinging Arrows at Democracy. Social
Choice Theory,  Value Pluralism, and Democratic  Politics, 90 COLUM.  L. REv.  2121,  2154-57
(1990).
June  1992] 1213LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES  LAW REVIEW
taxes, or otherwise severely constraining the legislature in an area of diffi-
cult policy choices, troubles many.
I believe criticisms of the idea that social rights are analytically the
same as civil rights are wrong.25  Civil rights implicate positive govern-
mental  action no less  than social  rights do.  The argument  has  several
components.
First, immediately  after the domain of civil rights was expanded to
encompass the right to vote and the right to be free from discrimination
in the job market,  protecting  civil rights  entailed  positive action by the
United  States  government.  The  government  must  establish  voting
schemes in which everyone's vote counts.  When nongovernmental actors
prevent someone  from voting, the present legal  culture finds a violation
of the right to vote. 6  Thus, protecting the right to vote means that the
government  must act  positively  to eliminate  such  interferences.  Simi-
larly, governments  must establish mechanisms  to enforce the civil rights
limitation  on  discrimination  by private  employers,  which  also  require
positive steps by the government.
Second,  we need  to specify  more precisely what  is meant by  "pro-
tecting a right."  Some rights are purely formal in the sense that we de-
mand only that the laws refer to those rights in the correct way but are
unconcerned  about associated social consequences.  For example,  a for-
mal right to equality based on race would be satisfied by laws-such  as
laws dealing with housing-that made no reference to race, even though
as a practical matter the quality of the housing available to people varied
significantly based on race.
Other rights  are more concerned with the actual distribution of so-
cial  benefits  and  burdens.  In  the jargon  of the  constitutional  lawyer,
these  rights  deal  with  "effects"  or "disparate  impact."  For example,
many people believe that the constitutional protection of free exercise of
religion requires the government to adjust its programs  to take account
of the impact those programs have on the practices of religious believers,
even if the programs  make no reference  to religion at all.  The Supreme
Court's decision that Oregon  could deny unemployment benefits to peo-
ple who  were  fired because  they used  peyote as  part  of their religious
25.  Although I also disagree with the assertion that courts are relatively less competent  to
deal  with social  rights than with civil rights, I confine  my argument to the claim  that social
rights are positive while  civil rights  are negative.
26.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971  (1988)  ("Whenever  any person has engaged or...  is about
to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege
secured by subsection  (a) [which  secures  the right to  vote]  . . . the  Attorney  General  may
institute ...  a civil action  .... ").
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practice 7  was  widely  criticized. 8  The  Court treated  the free  exercise
right as purely formal-satisfied by an anti-drug law that was neutral on
its face-when in fact that right must be concerned  with effects.
As  this example  suggests, judicial  enforcement  of formal rights  is
quite limited.  Formal constitutional rights provide statements of consti-
tutional  aspiration; that is, they identify values to which everyone  ought
to be sensitive.  Therefore, legislatures ought to strive to devise programs
that accommodate  values  inherent  in  formal  rights.  Moreover,  courts
ought to interpret statutes with an  eye to those values.
The important point  is that many civil rights are, to a  substantial
degree, formal rights.  Social rights may be similarly formal.  A right to
housing, for example, may be satisfied when the legislature adopts a pro-
gram aimed at assuring housing for all, even if the program falls short of
the mark.  To the extent that civil rights are simply formal rights (which
I believe  considerable)  and that they  serve  as  statements  of aspiration
rather than as enforceable legal norms, they may not differ substantially
from many social rights.
Third, consider  the idea  of "effects."  Suppose  that when  we  call
something a right, we mean that we would be concerned  if people in the
society could not, as a practical matter, exercise the right.  So, for exam-
ple, a society might protect a purely formal right to free speech, and yet
the means of communication  might be so concentrated  that policies  op-
posed  by those  who  controlled  the media  could  not be effectively  put
before the public.  Similarly, as to the right of racial equality:  many peo-
ple believe that such a right is violated when,  despite a regime in which
law  makes no reference  to race, social benefits and burdens are  in fact
distributed  differentially  according to race.
If this is our conception of rights, or of some particular rights, then
a  right will be protected  only when adequate provision is made for the
effective exercise of that right.  Thus, to protect rights, people must have
access  to the means of communication;  social benefits and burdens must
be  "re"-distributed.  This subset of civil rights,  then,  like social rights,
would  require positive government action.29
27.  Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources  v. Smith, 494 U.S.  872 (1990).
28.  Donald L. Beschle, Paradigms  Lost:  The Second Circuit Faces the New Era of Reli-
gious Clause  Jurisprudence,  57 BROOK. L. REv. 547, 547-48, 592-93 (1991);  James D. Gordon,
III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79  CAL.  L. Rnv.  91,  92-97  (1991);  Kenneth  Marin,
Note, Employment Division  v. Smith:  The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise
Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV.  1431,  1466-67,  1474-76  (1991).
29.  The size of this subset is of course an open question.  Indeed, to the extent that people
are concerned about the positive requirements of social rights, they may be attracted to formu-
lations  of civil rights that minimize the  apparent need for  positive provision.  My  only point
June 1992] 1215LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Fourth, the objection to social rights is that they require governmen-
tal distribution  of important social  goods,  either  by legislatures  or  by
courts.  Yet civil  rights  involve  similar questions  of distribution.  The
point has  been put most forcefully  by proponents  of restrictions on  the
availability of pornography.  Proponents  of these restrictions  argue that
women's liberty is restricted-their ability to walk on the streets without
fear is limited-when pornography is freely  available.30  The manner  in
which free speech rights are distributed affects  the distribution of other
societal goods,  such as freedom of action.  Thus, when  a society defines
free speech or other civil  rights, it is defining  what it regards  as  an ac-
ceptable distribution of important social rights.
The pornography  example  does not  quite bring us to social rights,
because the claim is that defining one civil right, free speech,  in one way
rather than another  affects the distribution of another civil  right.  Con-
sider, however, the problem of campaign financing.  To the extent that
free  speech principles restrict a nation's  ability to regulate  campaign  fi-
nancing,  substantive  political  outcomes  regarding  social  rights  are  af-
fected.  Put crudely, making  it difficult to regulate  campaign  financing
helps preserve the status quo with respect to the distribution of shelter,
food and jobs.  The point is quite general:  the definition of civil  rights
affects the degree to which  social rights will be promoted." 1  It therefore
cannot be a distinctive criticism of social rights that defining what they
are involves  determining the distribution of social benefits  and burdens,
for the same is true when civil rights  are defined.32
here  is that the operative  distinction  is not congruent  with the  distinction between  civil and
social  rights.
30.  Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency:  A  Critique of
MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,  100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2253,  2259  (1991)
(book review).  The analytic point  does not depend on whether one  agrees that such restric-
tions ought to be imposed.  The  empirical  premise may be questioned,  but not, I  think, the
analytic point.
31.  I do not contend, of course, that the definition  of every civil right affects  the distribu-
tion of social rights to the same degree:  consider the difference  between free speech (connected
to campaign financing)  and the Confrontation Clause.  I do believe, however, that the defini-
tion of every civil right has some effect on the distribution of social rights:  consider the effect
on  child-rearing  of  different  definitions  of  the  right  of  confrontation  in  child  abuse
prosecutions.
32.  There is a weaker reciprocal point.  Once civil rights are guaranteed, political interests
will find it useful to raise questions about the distribution of social rights affected by the way in
which  market rights are defined.  Unless constitutional  guarantees  protect the distribution of
social rights  against alteration,  see Lochner v. New York,  198  U.S. 45  (1905),  repudiated  by
Day-Brite  Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,  342 U.S.  421  (1952)  and Ferguson  v. Skrupa, 372  U.S.
726  (1963),  how  civil rights  are  defined  affects,  albeit  in an  indeterminate way,  how  social
rights are  distributed.
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Another way of making this point is that those who distinguish be-
tween civil and social rights assume that the distribution of housing, jobs
and food  results from private ordering-market processes-with  which
the government is uninvolved.  Yet, as the current experience in Central
and Eastern Europe abundantly  shows, government is essentially  impli-
cated in structuring markets.  The choices  open to system designers are,
in a sense, transparent,  while the choices that have been made in more
established  systems are opaque.
Finally, consider the objection that "government  in the large"  may
perhaps determine the distribution of food, jobs and housing by structur-
ing markets, but courts  should not.  Courts may be appropriate institu-
tions  to  define  civil  rights, but  they  are  inappropriate  institutions  to
define social rights.33  Yet the distinction between civil and social rights
is thinner than its proponents claim.  Civil rights include the right to own
property, to act freely subject to ordinary liability rules and to enter into
contracts.  The manner in which those rights are defined determines how
the interests protected by social rights are distributed.34
For example,  if a society defines the right to dispose of property to
include  a factory  owner's power to shut down the plant whenever  he or
she wants, jobs may be more at risk than if the property  right is defined
so as to permit a shutdown only if certain conditions are met.35  There is
nothing  in  the nature  of the concept  of property,  or other  civil rights,
that forecloses the second definition of property.  Yet, of course, the two
definitions have quite different implications for the protection that soci-
ety  accords  work.  If we want to assure  a  certain  distribution  of jobs,
shelter and food, we can reach that goal by a careful  definition of prop-
erty rights.
Undoubtedly,  the distribution of investment between plants covered
by plant-closing laws and other economic opportunities will vary depend-
ing on the property and contract regimes a  society has; if plant-closing
laws  define property  rights only with respect to what used to be called
the commanding heights of the economy, there will be more investment
33.  Again, I forego  a direct challenge to the  claim of judicial incapacity.
34.  For an extended discussion,  see Karl E. Kare, Legal Theory and Democratic Recon-
struction: Reflections on 1989, 25 U. B.C. L. REv. 69  (1991).
35.  I put the point conditionally because the actual outcome will depend on who is author-
ized  to  make the  decision  that the  prescribed  conditions  for  shutdowns are  satisfied:  if the
owner must have a good faith belief that the conditions are satisfied, one set of outcomes might
follow, while if an administrative  agency must be satisfied,  another set might follow.
The Worker  Adjustment and  Retraining Notification  Act,  29  U.S.C.  §§ 2101-2109,  re-
quires  employers  to provide notification  of pending  plant-closings under specific  conditions,
thereby modifying the property rights they  previously had.  29 U.S.C.  §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
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in  "non-peak"  industries  than there  would  be if such  laws  applied  to
every enterprise.  As a result, the forms of material  well-being will also
differ:  less steel,  more computers,  perhaps.  These differences,  while ar-
guably relevant to the question of how wealthy  a society is, have essen-
tially no connection to the more important question of what the society's
level of social welfare is.  Social welfare takes into account all of society's
values in a way that money wealth does not.
In this way the distinction between civil and social rights collapses:
by defining the civil right to property in a specified way, we can accom-
plish whatever we want regarding  social rights.
Arguably, the preceding point may be correct when considering the
initial  distribution  of property,  but  transactions  between  freely  con-
tracting parties will undo whatever  provision of social rights we accom-
plish  through  the  initial  definition  of property  rights.  The  next  step
though should  be  obvious:  nothing  in the nature of civil  rights  deter-
mines what definition of "freedom  with respect to contract"  the society
should  adopt.  Any  system  will  have  exceptions  or  conditions  under
which it may be said that a party was not freely contracting.  One man-
ner in which society may limit freedom of contract is through the law of
incapacity.  The system could have a quite narrow definition of incapac-
ity, limiting it to lunatics and children, and it could invalidate only con-
tracts procured by fraud narrowly defined.  But, again, nothing inherent
in the notion of civil rights bars a broader  definition  of incapacity.  A
system could, without violating any accepted notions of civil rights, hold
that a person who  lacked knowledge or appreciation  of some important
characteristics associated with a transaction-including the transaction's
impact on the long-term distribution of power-lacked capacity  to enter
into  a binding contract.  Instead of taking intellectual  capability  as the
measure of capacity, it could recognize cognitive impairments that make
it unlikely that the party accepting the short end of the deal truly under-
stood what was  at stake.
By  coupling  a  careful  definition  of initial  property  rights  with  an
equally  careful definition  of the conditions  of "free  contract,"  then, we
arrive  at whatever  specification  of social rights  we  want.  Notice,  too,
that this regime involves  only the traditional  categories of property  and
contract, that is, legal  categories whose definition  is ordinarily  remitted
to the courts.  In short, if we think that courts have the ability to define
civil rights, we must think that they have the ability to determine social
rights.  The  only  question is  whether  they will be sufficiently  aware  of
that ability.
None of this is to say, of course, what choices  societies should make
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as they define civil or social rights.  My only point is that people involved
in the process should not attempt to distinguish between civil and social
rights in the way  many have suggested.
III.  CONCLUSION
I am quite certain that the argument in Section II will seem to most
readers entirely wrong.  The distinction between civil and social rights is
so ingrained  in our way of thinking about fundamental  law that we are
likely  to  believe  that,  somehow,  any  argument  against  the distinction
must  be wrong.  The  lesson of Section  I, however,  is  that distinctions
among types of rights are  historically contingent.  At any time, a legal
culture will take the distinctions it uses as capturing something essential
about social and legal order.  Here, as elsewhere, historical consciousness
may be quite subversive:  it helps us understand that people in the past
believed that the distinctions they drew were natural, even as we  can see
that they were not.
Reconstruction  legal  culture used the terms civil  rights  and social
rights.  So do we.  What the terms refer to, however, has changed dra-
matically.  Reconstruction legal culture treated its terms as capturing the
essence of the social and legal order.  We treat ours similarly.  That their
culture has changed into ours, however, should suggest skepticism about
our understanding  of our own legal culture.
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